The yugaPad-way of Using WorDs: hoW a lingUistic taboo became a crUcial literary strategy 1 tiziana pontillo abstract: tiziana pontillo. The yugapad-way of Using Words: How a Linguistic Taboo Became a Crucial Literary Strategy. lingua posnaniensis, vol. lV (2)/2013 . the poznań Society for the advancement of the arts and Sciences. pl as kātyāyana emphasizes while commenting on the ekaśeṣa-rules, words apply per object. consequently, no word should be capable of conveying more than one object. By contrast not only does paronomasia, the so-called śleṣa, break the one-to-one relation between the śabda-and artha-levels of language; there are also grammatical rules which look like deviations from the naturally expected cause-effect relation between word forms and their meanings. the ekaśeṣa-rule represents one of these exceptions, since some parts of the artha are comprehensible, even without employing the word-form denoting them, such as mātṛ in the dual noun pitarau, meaning 'mother and father' rather than 'the two fathers'. patañjali already mentions an intriguing option in the use of śabdas, when he notes that a word form can merely convey its primary denotation, such as candra denoting the 'moon', or can express something that is 'like something else', such as candra conveying the sense of a 'face like a moon'. these exceptions are reconsidered here within the framework of the "yugapad-expression", which is how Bhartṛhari defines one of the two language options (the other one being kramaḥ 'sequence'), an option realised when a single word simultaneously conveys more than one meaning, but an option whose use is discouraged. technical (ritual and grammatical) speculations on simultaneity as an exception to the bi-unique relationship between a cause and its effect date back to the 2nd to 3rd centuries BC. nonetheless, grammarians insist on excluding these extreme applications of meaning extension; only the late kāvyālaṃkāra-śāstra-authors extol the virtues of the phenomenon. the paper focuses on the trajectory that might have been followed in the intervening changes. key words: biplanar morphology, meaning and form (the one-to-one principle), polysemy, paronomasia, sanskrit technical literature tiziana pontillo, university of Cagliari, Italy, pontillo@unica.it 1 this paper is part of a wider research project on the problem of lack of symmetry between the semantic and phono-morphological levels of language, which started in 1999 with my phD dissertation on zero in pāṇini's grammar. Several parts of this project have been shared with M.p. Candotti and more recently with g. Boccali, with regard to the possible dependence of the alaṃkāra reflections about rūpakas and śleṣa on grammatical theories, and with e. Freschi, as far as the comparison between the Vyākaraṇa, kalpasūtra, and Mīmāṃsa traditions is concerned. lp lV (2) tiziana pontillo 1. yaugapadyam as a mere potentiality of language the starting point for the present inquiry is a Sanskrit passage which should date back to the 5th century Ce, included in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya, which mentions the linguistic power of denoting jointly/simultaneously more than one meaning, 2 as a common feature of words, which nevertheless has to be avoided, in order to allow for a proper functioning of language: In this case three factors are recognized as determining the proper meaning to be selected (excluding any others), namely 1) the purpose of the whole sentence, 2) the general context, 3) the specific syntactic construction which contains the targeted word. elsewhere the list of factors is broader, but they always aim at relegating the yaugapadya of words to mere potentiality.
2. the ritual and linguistic taBoo the ultimate background of this linguistic position is a well-rooted belief in a strict relationship between word-form and meaning, which is enunciated for instance in kātyāyana's first vārttika in patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, according to which 'the word, the object denoted, and the relation between the two are well established on account of everyday usage.' 4 this tradition proposes one-to-one relationship between word-form and meaning:
5 'Because word forms apply per object (praty-artham), there is no denotation of many objects by one word form […] In case of denotation of more than one object (anekārthābhidhāne), there would be more than one word form (anekaśabdatvam).' 6 kātyāyana and patañjali seem to resort to this one-to-one symmetry between the semantic and the phono-morphological levels in order to establish linguistic analysis on the basis of a biplanar definition of the morpheme, according to the two well-known complementary systematic actions of association (anvaya) and distinction (vyatireka), aimed respectively at 2 as a consequence, several meanings are metaphorically included in the same yuga 'yoke'. 3 of course Vp 2.251 might sound appropriate both for padavādins and for vākyavādins, i.e. for proponents of the thesis that the minimum meaningful linguistic units are inflected words or sentences respectively, depending on which sense of word-form (śabda) is meant - either an inflected word or a whole syntagm (yoga) and more. the former option is suggested by the following example: Vp 2.252: 'as the ball [of flesh] endowed with dew-lap etc. is denoted by the word-form go, in the same way the word-form go is established in the sense of Vāhīka' (i.e. a member of the Vāhīka tribe). this statement about yaugapadyam is consistent with Bhartṛhari's general point of view, only provided that it deals with a purely pragmatic chance of reflecting on the single parts (avayavas) of a sentence.
4 m 1.6 l. catching the continuity and discontinuity between different compared units.
7 they thus apply the same principle to all and even the smallest meaningful linguistic units, 8 so that morphemic linguistic units can convey their meaning only if actually uttered within the word.
according to patañjali, word forms (śabdas) are considered perceptible causes, giving rise to the cognition of objects (arthas) as their effect, i.e. the addresser actually needs to employ words in order to arouse the relevant mental image in the mind of the addressee. without this perceptible input no meaning could ever be brought about.
9 analogously in jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras, which might have been contemporary with kātyāyana's vārttikas and consequently antecedent to the Mahābhāṣya, we often find statements such as the following, where a comparable one-to-one correspondence between words and ritual acts, and between ritual acts and their goals is established.
More than one word-form [to denote the same object] is not proper.
10
where there is a different word (śabda), there is a different act (karman), because of the connection with that which is actually performed [i.e. with its subsidiary actions and details]. the repetition of one and the same word should also [indicate differences between acts]; because, if there were no difference, the repetition would be useless.
11
to sum up, both the early grammatical and the Mīmāṃsā tradition set up a biunique correspondence between word-form and meaning, so that no verbal communication should be realizable without the physical perception of words, nor should any single perceptible unit be capable of conveying more than one meaning at the same time. as a consequence, it is amazing though undisputable, that, as regards the history of literature and poetics, we have to wonder 'why South asian culture was so fascinated with the possibility of saying two things at the same time', as Yigal Bronner (2010: 3) states in his recent remarkable work on the history of the Indian tradition of paronomasia (śleṣa). 12 Cf. Deshpande 1989: 113: 'there is a doctrine that ideally there should be a perfect match between the meaning (artha) and the words (śabda), i.e. that there should not be more words used to express the same meaning which has been expressed by one word (uktārthānām aprayogaḥ) and there should ideally be a different meaning for every different word (arthabhede śabdabhedaḥ/śabdabhede arthabhedaḥ). out of such considerations, in traditions dealing with interpretation of ritual texts, poetry etc., many different conceptions arose to account for this seeming gap between the manifest utterance and the intended or comprehended meaning.' Furthermore the nyāya-, Mīmāṃsā- and kāvyālaṃkāra-traditions involve two traditional techniques - the so-called arthādhyāhāra and the padādhyāhāra which consist in a suppletion respectively of meaning and of (missing) words, even though they are of course generally interested in these methods in the context of hermeneutics rather than with respect to linguistic analysis (cf. Deshpande 1985: 54 and 1989: 114-115, 119-20) . lp lV (2) tiziana pontillo
In actual fact, during the first centuries of the Common era, paronomasia begins to appear among many other tropes and figures of speech in the first extant works by the Buddhist poet aśvaghoṣa, although it only gains real prominence around the 6th century, when poets start extensively to experiment with punning and bitextuality.
13 From a historical point of view some scholars have highlighted the possible reasons which determined this tendency to exploit the possibilities offered by the language.
14 with regard to more recent literature, Bronner (2010: 133) suggests that 'the poetry of dual and multiple targets was a specialized niche that Sanskrit carved for itself partly in response to the rise of regional literary languages', labelled as a "Vernacular Revolution" by pollock 2006. In fact this coincided with 'the veritable lexicographical boom' dating back to the 12th century, which included many lexicons of homonymous words, often even mistakenly ascribed to poets known for their inclinations to paronomasia.
It is difficult to contradict Bronner's important thesis that it was not 'an objective measure of ambiguity' of Sanskrit that rendered this language 'more śleṣa friendly than another' by nature, but rather 'its accurate description and its complex and elegant metalinguistic conceptualization of vast linguistic phenomena' which might have supported this passion for linguistic puns. For instance, as is well known, Sanskrit came to possess a near-perfect description of the euphonic glides and assimilations that paronomasia often relies on, and they were studied and memorized by every educated person. as a consequence, mastery in poetry and advanced knowledge of grammar were very essential parts in the training of poet-candidates.
nevertheless, the grammatical tradition itself established - so neatly, as we have seen - the prohibition of the simultaneous signification of more than one meaning by a single word-form. thus we wonder what happened, i.e. how a linguistic taboo, the prohibition of contravening the principle of one-to-one correspondence between word forms and meanings, might have become a significant literary strategy, namely the use of śleṣa, i.e. paronomasia, in sanskrit poetry. Furthermore, we should also pay attention to the diachrony of the use of this figure in the history of poetry. In fact, paronomasia emerges and replaces not only metaphorical identifications (rūpakas) at the very moment of their disappearance, but also and more specifically, it takes the place of the complex metaphors, so characteristically and frequently found in the earliest works of classical poetry.
15
My present proposal consists in trying to reconstruct a part of the pattern which might have been followed in the intervening change, by focusing on the terminology involved in the relevant technical literature. although it may not be possible to understand why it actually happened, at least a tentative answer will be advanced about how and when the simultaneous/joint signification might have been accepted as a technical option. guage and already introduces the well known division into the two species that will become meaning- and form-based (artha-and śabda-śleṣas) respectively in the later tradition such as in udbhaṭa's work.
a śleṣa is the desired [expression] having one form (ekarūpānvitaṃ) but more than one sense (anekārtham). It is of two kinds, depending on its relying on non-segmented padas (i.e. on homonymous words) or on segmented padas (i.e. on a different segmentation of a sentence, which results in heteronymous words).
16
(kd 2.310) as far as the latter kind is concerned, even patañjali had already presented a couple of examples, 17 one of which is repeated by Bhartṛhari in his Mahābhāṣyadīpikā. these examples were analysed as follows:
'the white one (śvetaḥ) runs' (2) 'the dog (śvā) runs from here (itaḥ)' Bhartṛhari's comment only elaborates on the former example, by explaining it better through adding the specific perspective of the relationship between speaker and listener: a user [of language, i.e. a speaker] uses the linguistic unit śvetaḥ 'white' either by saying śveto gaur 'a white ox' or by saying 'this dog is gone'; the listeners understand the meaning according to the part of the denotative power which is actually used. the linguistic units which have been pronounced are two (e.g. the two forms 'śvetaḥ'), because of their different meaning.
19
thus, if the same linguistic unit (śvetaḥ) conveying two different meanings is uttered, the listener will infer that the speaker either chooses to say white or the dog is gone, and therefore the listener has to catch the correct option. In other words, Bhartṛhari seems to ignore here the possibility that a single speaker might aim at conveying more than one meaning through the same linguistic unit, as a rhetorical and poetic device.
Bhartṛhari also mentions two lexical examples of polysemy, i.e. of the non-segmented type of paronomasia:
'along with'
In this way the double typology of the linguistic phenomenon of polysemy is inaugurated, even though the phenomenon is not yet named śleṣa. a rhetorical background seems to be presupposed by these grammatical examples.
Certainly more intriguing is the possibly earliest 21 definition of paronomasia (termed śliṣṭa) by Bhāmaha (7th c. Ce), included in his work on poetics (kāvyālaṃkāra), in a passage that also uses the term yugapad - the focus of this paper.
the real essence of the subject of comparison, when it is realized by the standard by means of quality, action, and name, is denoted as paronomasia. But this is the essential feature which also characterizes a metaphorical identification (rūpaka), only if wanted. the simultaneous/joint usage (yugapad) of subject and standard of comparison is preferred.
22 (Bhka 3.14-15)
Since Bhāmaha himself suggests a comparison of paronomasia with metaphorical identification, it may be worthwhile to actually compare his definition of the latter: the real essence of the subject of comparison (upameya), when it is represented by the standard (upamāna), is known under the name of rūpaka, provided that the identity of their qualities has been perceived.
(Bhka 2.21)
In fact only the main verb changes, from sādhyate 'is realized' to rūpyate 'is represented, is depicted as'. therefore as far as paronomasia is concerned, it deals with a denotationprocess, but the metaphorical identification is merely a cognitive process: Something is known as if it were something else. the reality of the subject of comparison is better known through the mention, side by side, of a similar reality, whose similarity has to be directly checked.
24
judging from this comparison between the two figures, Bhāmaha can be suspected of being aware of the already mentioned diachronic trend of changing from the metaphortendency (of the earlier kāvya poetry) to paronomasia. the final linguistic target of poetry, i.e. the favourite option, seems to be precisely the yugapad-expression, where a single linguistic input simultaneously determines more than one meaning-effect. the hint at a sort of analysis of the whole subject of comparison in its parts, qualities, and functions, which is included in both the figures and which points out the features that are comparable with some matching features of another whole entity, is also interesting. this dialectical relationship between a whole and its parts seems to constitute a sort of common preliminary step actually supporting both metaphor and paronomasia. It succeeds de facto in giving evidence of the acceptability of a mention, side by side, of two comparable subjects in metaphorical identification, or even of a single joint mention, i.e. of a śleṣa. an analogous preliminary step, aimed at checking the identity of parts in order to allow for a joint governing of their respective wholes, is also taught in the kalpasūtra-environment where the so-called tantra-procedure is explained, i.e. the chance of performing a subsidiary rite once only which can simultaneously (yugapad) be helpful for some other primary rites. this sounds like an exception to the more common symmetry between cause and effect, but it is evidently a well-regulated exception.
25 For instance, according to kśrSū 1.7.1-4 'the status of the jointly multiple value (yugapadbhāva) of ritual acts is called tantra' and it may occur, provided that the uniqueness of agent, fruit, action, place, time, substance, deity, and qualities is granted. what is especially noteworthy is that among the listed details that have to be shared, there are three which match those mentioned by Bhāmaha in his definition of paronomasia (quoted above) - quality, action, and name (of the deity to whom the performance is devoted).
26
Tantra is indeed often employed as a concise technical formula denoting a common/combined procedure in the most ancient ritual sūtras, e.g. in BaudhśrSū (25.31: 12X; 25.34: 2X) and in BhśrSū (8.25.11; 14.25.6) . It is opposed to the modality of single procedures repeated for each ritual act, as established e.g. in the following passage (BaudhśrSū 25.31): what is the common/combined procedure (tantram) as far as the pouring out of grains is concerned? taking of the ladle is common (tantram); taking the winnowing basket is common (tantram) […] the sāvitra formula is repeated at each grain.
27
the homonymous procedure involved in some Mīmāṃsā rules teaching the device by means of which an auxiliary element is performed once only and applied wherever needed, under certain conditions and in accordance with a sort of centralisation-principle, probably dates back to the same age. For instance, in MS 11.2.12-15, jaimini discusses the conditions for the application of tantra using the case of complex sacrifices which last a long time and are composed of various rites:
Since there is unity of the ritual act (aikakarmya) in the case of iṣṭi, rājasūya, and cāturmāsya, their subsidiaries (aṅga) should be tantras (i.e. apply once and for all). It is not so, due to the difference of time. no, because the [various rites happening at different times] are just parts (ekadeśa), as in the case of the animal-sacrifice. alternatively, since the ritual acts [composing the rājasūya, etc.] are distinct [and] since they have been prescribed as being tantra (i.e. to be performed once only), the teaching (upadeśa) [which enjoins one to perform them] must regard these [sacrifices] together with their subsidiaries.
28
Furthermore, a very interesting sequence in the preceding section (MS 11.1.55-71) even deals with the yaugapadya 'simultaneous value' of ritual elements, which was possibly lp lV (2) tiziana pontillo considered a more generic synonym of tantra, as also suggested by the definition found in the contemporary kātyśrSū 11.7 quoted above. the joint/simultaneous performance of several comparable subsidiaries is said to be available, provided that no distinction among the different subsidiary rites is perceived, and no separateness of time and injunction is registered. 29 therefore, setting aside strictly ritual technicalities, the perception of distinction is that which could actually block this option of simultaneous performance and make the bhedaoption compulsory. as seen above, Bhāmaha (Bhka 2.21) analogously emphasizes the importance of the perception of identity of the qualities inherent in the standard and in the subject of comparison, as a condition to be respected in a metaphorical identification. as a consequence, if we consider the shared focus of joint signification, as explained in the technical tradition devoted to ritual and poetics respectively, it is not so unexpected to find precisely this term tantra even involved in the paronomasia-definition proposed by another theoretician of poetics, namely Vāmana:
Metaphorical identification is the superimposition of real essences by reason of the identity of qualities between the subject of comparison and the standard of comparison. It deals with a paronomasia, if a combined/common procedure (tantram) is used with regard to the properties (of the subject and the standard of comparison).
30 4. SIMultaneouS/joInt SIgnIFICatIon oF woRD FoRMS now we can return to Bhartṛhari's concept of yaugapadya, which in the following quotations is opposed to the more common use of word forms in sequence, so that the actual use of word forms alternates with their absence.
there are two well-established ways of using word forms which the world does not overpass, either the sequence or the simultaneousness.
31 (Vp 2.467) there is a double way in this world: either the use of linguistic units or the simultaneousness. But what is the context of this Mahābhāṣyadīpikā passage? the object of the paspaśā passage of the Mahābhāṣya commented on here is the proposal to add a prohibition of using some incorrect vowels, which are not listed in the śivasūtras, but which could derive from them. after a long list of defects in the pronunciation of phonemes, patañjali (M 1.13 l. 27-14 l. 1 ad vt 18) finally refutes the proposed addition, by assuming that the prohibition at stake can be plainly deduced from two lists (gaṇas) of nominal stems (namely the gargādi and bidādi gaṇas) which are recited precisely without these defects. In other words, the recitation of these lists is supposed to have a double function; put differently, it would be a cause that serves two aims simultaneously, as it teaches both the whole (each whole word derived from each member of the lists), and its parts (each sound involved in the listed stems). as a consequence, these lists would respectively convey two different meanings at the same 29 Bhartṛhari's comment further elaborates deeply on the examples themselves, by putting them into a more specific and technical ritual frame.
at first the action of pouring water is recognised as the only cause which attains the two mentioned goals, i.e. both satisfying the ancestors and watering the trees, while any personal interest of the performer is explicitly denied. 34 Secondly, the mango trees are technically presented as the only promoters (prayojakas) 35 of the action, i.e. the only subjects which prompt the action of pouring water, even though the effect of this action is extended to the ancestors at the same time. It is supposed that the so-called prasaṅga-mechanism is at work, i.e. the extension of a function which proceeds via contiguity from one context to another, where it is required, and only if needed. to return to the grammatical side of the M passage: the teaching regarding the phonemes does not prompt the utterance of the lists, but is entailed in it by force of its multiple function, termed prasaṅga: alternatively, the establishment of the goal is characterised by an automatic involvement (prasaṅga). If [something] attains a goal through something else, while not prompting [the attainment of] that goal, it is called prasaṅga ... the mango trees prompt the watering separately (i.e. on their own); the ancestors do not prompt anything. In their case, they experience the offering of water, which is prompted [by the mango trees], by means of a prasaṅga-procedure.
36 (d 1.37 ll. 11-16 ad vt 18) eventually, before the examples of paronomasia quoted above ( § 3.1), Bhartṛhari also introduces the tantra-principle of extension (D 1.37 l. 17 - 38 l. 1) , while commenting on the more linguistically oriented part of the quoted patañjali passage. once again he states that linguistic units can be endowed with a cumulative denotative power, but only one part is used [at a time]. his final view on the lists that make both wholes and parts known is precisely based on the tantra-principle, which he exemplifies by comparison with a lamp: it may be compared to a lamp which works on the tantra-principle (tantreṇa): It operates according to the intended object of people who are in need of it or, through tantra, it brings about other (effects) for the single one who is desirous to see. (2) tiziana pontillo as already pointed out by Bronkhorst (1986: 78) , the lamp example coincides with the example chosen by śabara in order to illustrate the use of the tantra-procedure: like a lamp lit in the midst of many brahmans.
38 (śBh on ms 11.1.1)
By contrast, śabara proposes another efficient example based on the image of a lamp devoted to the other mentioned model of multiple application, i.e. to the prasaṅga-procedure:
like the light spreading also onto the public road by a lamp lit in a palace.
39 (śBh on ms 12.1.1) thus the focus of the tantra-feature of subsidiaries seems to be the place occupied by certain subsidiaries in the middle of a procedure, as a common part of a whole complex act; the focus of the prasaṅga-procedure is the automatic involvement of the effect prompted by a subsidiary act while working upon another subsidiary act too.
actually the source of this image of a polysemic lamp might have directly been MS 11.1.61, which pertains to a kind of subsidiary which provides benefits for more than one primary rite, although performed only once: 'or like a lamp on account of its influence (omnipresence).' 40 however, there is no trace of the distinction between the two different lamp-examples, as propounded so neatly by śabara. Furthermore, this sūtra is not focused on the tantra-or the prasaṅga-principle; it is rather included in a more generic discussion on the supposed orthodoxy of performing a subsidiary rite once, which can simultaneously be helpful for some other primary rites, namely on the so-called yaugapadyam, as ms 11.1.68 (mentioned in §3.2 above) clearly shows.
analogously, as we have briefly seen, in the Mahābhāṣya passage pertaining to the meaning extension of the teaching based on the gargādi and bidādi lists, there is only a mention of a generic effect-extension of pouring water for watering mango trees, compared with a double-aimed sentence. Bhartṛhari's and śabara's technically elaborate examples of this pair of mechanisms are far removed from this simple perspective, and above all Bhartṛhari seems to focus on the tantra-procedure as a traditional (already ritually established) means of solving the problem of the linguistic taboo which prevented every single word-form from simultaneously conveying more than one meaning.
In fact, the final effect of tantra on linguistic units is described by Bhartṛhari as a sort of process of multiplying the single utterance of a speaker, which ends up producing more than one utterance. he seems eager to avoid the prohibition, by nonetheless clinging to the general rules: 41 (D 1.37 ll. 24-25 ad vt 18) perhaps a further piece of evidence of the conscious level of this linguistic reversal advanced by Bhartṛhari is the immediately following reference to a strictly pāṇinian example connected to, but different from, the proper meaning is compared with a lamp (dīpa) which through proximity reveals other things than that for whose illumination it was employed (pra-yuj- the actions that relate to the two different objects of the ekaśeṣa linguistic form akṣa are of course different. the homonymous words can be repeated twice (or more), in order properly refer to each action (krama), or the repetition can be avoided (yugapad).
43
the extension of Bhartṛhari's reflection, and the remarkable concurrence of Vp passages closely comparable to this D text, seem to suggest that Bhartṛhari cherished this topic indeed. the close comparison with patañjali's great commentary unequivocally shows the distance between the two grammarians regarding the supposed descriptive and operative tantra-pattern of using words.
conclusions
In spite of the ritual and linguistic taboo examined above, the grammatical tradition is clearly conscious of the existence of some exceptions, such as the ekaśeṣa formations, and on the other hand, both the kalpasūtra- and Mīmāmsā-tradition elaborate a specific double meaning-extension strategy, by contiguity (prasaṅga) and by centralisation (tantra). thus Bhartṛhari and śabara seem to have played a role as a link between these two technical traditions and the treatises on poetics, particularly with regard to the relationship between the tantra-procedure and the figure of śleṣa or paronomasia. In fact they managed to highlight that the prasaṅga-and tantra-devices were two different but closely related features of the same meaning-extension-strategy, two different sides of the same coin, which actually did not conflict with the general one-to-one principle of correspondence.
Furthermore it is noteworthy that the specific attention to the parts, i.e. to the comparable dharmas of the wholes which can be simultaneously signified, continued for a long time. accordingly, even though it was not plainly admitted that a word could be directly replaced by another because of the well-established artha-śabda relation, at least two powers (śaktis) of the same word could be simultaneously activated, such as in the case of agni according to Vp 2.477: sometimes more than one power (śakti) of one [word] is heard simultaneously (yugapad), such as in the case of "fire", which is used sometimes, both for its light, and for its heat. Bhartṛhari's example is probably drawn from M 1.353 ll. 9-10 ad vt 7 ad a 1.4.105-8, where the three verbal forms determine the plural form of akṣāḥ. In the D we should perhaps suppose a shortened quotation of this passage to justify the plural form instead of the expected dual one. In fact, Vp 2.465-466 explains the same example more extensively, by quoting all the three verbs and by involving the term tantra as the device (upāya) which consists in the equality of form of the akṣas being simultaneously applied [to more than one verb].
44 anekā śaktir ekasya yugapac chrūyate kva cit. agniḥ prakāśadāhābhyām ekatrāpi niyujyate.
lp lV (2) tiziana pontillo as a consequence, attention was systematically diverted from the whole second object which is denoted by means of the tantra-principle, i.e. according to the yugapad way of using words, and rather pointed at the features or parts which are shared by the two objects taken into consideration. on the other hand, some traces of the arising tendency towards the yugapad way of using words by relying on some features of the second object which is yoked by a single word-form, could already be recognized in the following grammatical passage from patañjali, where two options for the use of śabdas are mentioned, and some risks are hinted at. as a consequence, the word form plakṣa might be used in order to denote a tree of the genus Ficus Infectoria or even to compare something (e.g. a Ficus Indica -nyagrodha) with a Ficus Infectoria (plakṣa), because of some shared features of these two objects. therefore, by using the dual plakṣau, two plakṣas could be denoted (by means of a normal dualinflected noun), or one plakṣa and one nyagrodha (by means of an ekaśeṣa) -a situation that is self-evidently fraught with (grammatical) risks. 46 to sum up, the approach followed in avoiding the mentioned linguistic taboo seems to have taken a very long time to develop, and the example of the use of plakṣau for denoting a plakṣa and a tree which is like a plakṣa, demonstrates how an overextension of the mechanism of yugapad denotation might have been considered problematic. the risk would lie in a lack of effective communication between speaker and hearer. as a consequence it is understandable that acceptance of the figure of paronomasia took such a long time, and that it required contributions from at least three different technical traditions.
an indirect indication of the extreme uncertainty regarding the choice of using paronomasia might be drawn from a nāṭya-śāstra passage. as noticed by thieken (2006: 98-100), a peculiarity of Bharata's lists of qualities and defects is that of matching a particular quality with a particular defect, i.e. what is depicted as a quality under certain circumstances can become a poetic flaw. Bharata consistently includes paronomasia among the listed qualities. Compare the following two aphorisms:
the combination (śliṣṭatā) of words connected to each other on the basis of desired meanings is called śleṣa.
47 (nś 17.96) the experts of poetry define poetry itself as having 'broken the meaning' where the intentional meaning is taken apart from the other one (the primary meaning).
48 (nś 17.90) Consequently, this precarious balance of the status of the joint signification, as something positive or negative, is possibly where the real challenge for the best poets actually lay, 45 
